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Abstract
In this paper we study the macroeconomic impact of a policy which changes the re-
distributive properties of an unfunded pension system. Using an overlapping generati-
ons model with a closed economy and heterogeneous agents, we show that a weaker link 
between contributions and benefits has an impact on the level of capital per capita if and 
only if there are inequalities in the length of life. Furthermore, this policy has positive 
implications for every economic agent if the system has a defined-benefit structure. The 
tax rate and inequalities decrease, whereas the wealth of each agent increases. However, 
with a defined-contribution pension system, this policy has a negative impact on every 
macroeconomic variable except on the wealth of the poorest agents.
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1 Introduction
Pension systems can be classified according to three dimensions (Feldstein and Li-
ebman (2002)). Firstly, they can adopt either a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) or a fully-fun-
ded structure1. The size of unfunded pension systems is large in most industrialized co-
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1 In this paper we only consider PAYG pension systems. In a portfolio approach, Dutta et al. (2000) show that 
a mixed pension system is desirable because of the differences in the risks between funded and unfunded pension 
systems.340
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untries. For example, the payroll tax rate used to finance them ranges from 12.4% for the 
United-States to 29.6% for Italy (Nyce and Schieber (2005: 236)).
Secondly, pension systems can have either a defined-benefit or a defined-contribution 
structure. A pension system has a defined-benefit structure if it is the tax rate that adjusts 
itself to changes in the economic and demographic environment. Conversely, it has a de-
fined-contribution organization if it is the replacement rate that adjusts itself. Most coun-
tries have chosen a defined-benefit pension system (Nyce and Schieber (2005)). Howe-
ver, because of the increase in life expectancy, the fiscal burden of this structure has in-
creased strongly. Consequently, some countries, such as Italy, have adopted a defined-
contribution pension system2.
Thirdly, pension systems can be more Beveridgeian or more Bismarckian. A pensi-
on system is purely Beveridgeian if every agent receives the same pension. Conversely, 
a pension system is purely Bismarckian if pensions depend completely on the wages of 
agents. A pension system is mixed if it has a Beveridgeian and a Bismarckian component. 
The more Beveridgeian a pension system, the higher the intra-generational transfers. Co-
untries differ sharply by this intra-generational component. France, Germany and Italy 
have a Bismarckian structure. The systems in Canada, the Netherlands and New-Zeland 
are essentially Beveridgeian. Finally, Japan, the United-Kingdom and the United States 
have mixed pension systems (Sommacal (2006), Casamatta et al. (2000)).
Theoretical literature has explored the impact on the economic activity of the size 
of PAYG pension systems3 that has either the Beveridgeian or Bismarckian structure4. 
The usual result is that the Bismarckian systems provide more incentives to accumula-
te human and physical capital and thus induce a higher growth rate than the Beveridgei-
an pension systems. But in fact, pension systems are usually a combination of these two 
elements. Only a few authors have studied the impacts of a change along the third axis 
mentioned above5. However, it is a central issue given the wide dispersion of countries 
along this third axis.
The main idea of this paper is that PAYG pension systems can adopt a structure which 
combines the Bismarckian and Beveridgeian components, and we study the impacts of a 
policy which increases the Beveridgeian component of pension systems. We show that 
these effects are different, depending on whether the pension system has a defined-bene-
fit or a defined-contribution structure. Last but not least, the inequalities of the length of 
life play an important role in the qualitative and quantitative results of this paper.
There is a growing empirical literature which analyzes these inequalities. Mesrine 
(1999) studies the inequalities in the length of life according to socio-professional gro-
2 In this paper we do not explain the switch from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution pension system. A 
model with a representative agent and an increasing life expectancy would be more appropriate for this study.
3 See Belan and Pestieau (1998), Breyer and Straub (1993) or Homburg (1990) among others for the analysis of 
the transition from unfunded pension systems towards fully-funded pension systems.
4 See Docquier and Paddison (2003), or Casarico and Devillanova (2007). These results are questioned notably 
by Groezen et al. (2007), Lambrecht et al. (2005) or Le Garrec (2005).
5 Except Sommacal (2006) using an endogenous labor supply model with a defined-contribution pension sys-
tem.341
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ups in France6. The most striking feature of his paper is that a worker has an almost twice 
higher probability to die at the age between 35 and 65 years than an executive manager. 
Furthermore, their life expectancies at the age of 35 are 38 and 44 respectively. The same 
qualitative results are recorded in the United States (Panis and Lillard (1995), Deaton and 
Paxson (2000)).
Finally, Robert-Bobbée and Cadot (2007) show that this inequality is also observed for 
elderly people. For agents who are 86, those with the highest education level can expect 
to live 20% longer than the ones with the lowest education level.
Only a few papers have explored the economic impacts of these health inequalities. 
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996: 365) emphasized that these health inequalities have implicati-
ons on the redistributive properties of pension systems, but they did not provide any em-
pirical or analytical analysis. Drouhin (2001) showed by a small open economy that a Bi-
smarckian PAYG pension system induces transfers from agents with a short life expec-
tancy to agents with a long life expectancy. His model is the first step in studying the im-
pacts of the inequalities in the length of life but he only uses the Bismarckian structure 
and there are no general equilibrium effects in his model. The political economy litera-
ture has recently become interested in the implications of the link between life expectan-
cy and wages7.
In this paper we study the macroeconomic impact of a policy which modifies the re-
distributive properties of an unfunded pension system8. In order to obtain clear qualitati-
ve results for every macroeconomic variable, we first present an analytical resolution of 
our model. Then, because the impact is ambiguous for some variables, we calibrate our 
model on French data and we numerically solve our model. We work with French data 
because the French pension system is highly Bismarckian (Casamatta et al. (2000)) and 
because the efficiency of such a system is widely questioned. However, we also show that 
our numerical results do not depend on this specific case. Using an overlapping generati-
ons model with a closed economy and heterogeneous agents, we show that a weaker link 
between contributions and benefits has an impact on the level of capital per capita if and 
only if there are inequalities in the length of life. We also show that this redistributive po-
licy has positive implications for every economic agent if the system has a defined-bene-
fit structure. The tax rate and inequalities decrease, whereas the wealth of each agent in-
creases. However, with a defined-contribution pension system, this policy has a negative 
impact on every macroeconomic variable except on the wealth of the poorest agents.
Gorski et al. (2007) also emphasize the role of the mortality differential in analyzing 
the impact on educational choices of a change towards a more Beveridgeian pension sy-
stem. They find that this impact is positive. In this paper, we analyze the impact of this 
policy on physical capital accumulation.
6 These inequalities also depend on other factors like sex or geographical localization. For example, in France 
the life expectancy of women is 84.1, whereas that of men is only 77.2 (INSEE, 2006). Moreover, Rican and Salem 
(1999) show that there are strong disparities according to the localization of people in France.
7 Borck (2007) shows that the size of a pension system can be determined by a coalition of elderly, very poor 
and very rich agents. Poor agents benefit from the Beveridgeian part of the pension system, whereas rich agents ben-
efit from the pension system for the longest time.
8 In this paper the term “redistributivity” means that we change the Bismarckian structure of pension systems. A 
decrease in the redistributivity means that there is a stronger link between wages and pensions per unit of time.342
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the main elements of our model. 
In Section 3, we detail the dynamics of the economy and its properties. The implications 
in terms of utility and inequalities are studied in Section 4. In Section 5 we calibrate and 
solve our model. Finally, Section 6 includes some closing remarks.
2 The Model
It is assumed that two generations, the young and the old, overlap in each period t. 
Their respective sizes are Nt and Nt-1. The population grows at a constant rate n, so that 
Nt = (1+n) Nt-1. At the beginning of his life, each member of a generation receives a pro-
ductivity endowment a. This productivity takes its values in the interval Ωa = [a–, a+]. The 
density function and the cumulative distribution function of a are denoted by f (a) and F 
(a) respectively. These functions are such that: 
 
= 1, F(a– ) = 0 i F (a+). 
Furthermore,   denotes the average productivity of the economy:
 
(1)
The density function f (a) is assumed to be independent of time and of the level of 
capital.
Each agent lives completely his first period of life9 but only a fraction T (a) of his se-
cond period of life10. We assume that T’ (a) > 0. The higher the productivity, the larger 
the length of life. In this exercise we assume that the length of life depends positively on 
the productivity level of each agent. In our model, the wage level is an increasing fun-
ction of the productivity level. Consequently, the assumption on T(a) uses the empirical 
evidence that the wage level is a significant variable to explain the mortality differential 
between agents (Adams et al. (2003))11. Borck (2007) uses the same assumption in a po-
litical economy framework.
The average length of life is denoted by   and is determined by: 
 
(2)
The link between productivity and the length of life is measured by the covariance: 
 
(3)
9 The length of each period is normalized to 1.
10 There is no uncertainty in this economy to simplify our model. However, our model can also be interpreted as 
a model with uncertain lifetime. In that case, there is a probability that an agent survives at the end of his first period 
of life, as in Drouhin (2001). It also implies that there exists a perfect annuity market for each group of agents.
11 See also Mesrine (1999), Pannis and Lillard (1995), or Deaton and Paxson (2000).343
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This covariance is positive because of our assumption on the sign of T’ (a) > 0 (See 
Appendix E). The stronger the link between T (a) and a, the bigger the covariance. Con-
versely, if T’ (a) =0, i.e. if the length of life is the same for every agent, then this cova-
riance is zero.
2.1 Consumers
The utility of consumers depends on their consumption flows in their two periods of 
life. For an agent born in the period endowed with a productivity level a, ct (a), and dt+1 
(a)/T(a) denote the first period and the second period consumption flows respectively. 
Their utility function is intertemporally separable and has the following form12: 
 
(4)
where β represents the pure time preference factor for the present, and the T (a) in front 
of their second period utility implies that the longer the length of life, the more consumers 
value their utility of this period.13
Each agent offers inelastically his work during his first period of life and obtains a 
wage w(a)14. This wage is taxed at a rate τ, and the revenues from this tax are used to fi-
nance a PAYG pension system. When an agent becomes old, he receives a pension p(a). 
Budget constraints on an agent born in a period t, are as follows:
ct(a) = wt(a) (1 – τ) – St(a) (5)
dt+1(a) = Rt+1St(a) + pt+1(a) (6)
where Rt+1 represents the interest factor and St (a) the saving function.
We also assume that the utility function has the following form: u(x) = ln (x). It sim-
plifies the analytical expressions15. Based on all these assumptions, the saving function 
is the following: 
 
(7)
12 It implies that the marginal rate of substitution between ct and dt+1 depends on the length of life.
13 In this paper we do not represent fertility choices even though life expectancy inequalities and wage inequal-
ities do impact on these choices.
14 In doing so, we do not model the burden of income taxation on labour supply.
15 It notably simplifies the conditions that will be obtained and the aggregation of the saving functions. Our qual-
itative results do not depend on this assumption.344
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2.2 Firms
We assume a perfect competition on the final goods market and on the inputs mar-
ket. The production function of firms is as follows:16
 
(8)
where  0 < α < 1, Kt represents the physical capital level, and A > 0 the level of technolo-
gy. As there is perfect competition on each market, firms take wages and interest factors 
as given. Profit maximisation implies the following expressions for prices, given that the 
final good is the numéraire: 
 
(9)
 
(10)
where kt ≡ Kt /N represents the capital level per young agent. wt is the wage per efficiency 
unit of work. The wage for agents with a productivity level a is the following: 
 
(11)
It implies that relative wages are independent of the level of capital, whereas abso-
lute differences in wages depend on it.
In the rest of this paper,   will denote the average wage in the economy at period t. 
It has the following expression:
 
(12)
2.3 The Pension System
We assume a PAYG pension system. The revenues of this system come from a pro-
portional tax on wages: τ. It is used to provide a pension for elderly people. Their pensi-
on depends on the wages of young agents having the same productivity as theirs, and on 
the average wage in the economy. Their respective weights are λ and (1 – λ). The first 
part of this pension represents the Bismarckian component, whereas the second part re-
16 Our results do not depend on the form of the production function but it clarifies our analysis with simple ana-
lytical results.345
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presents the Beveridgeian component of this system (Casamatta et al. (2000)). λ measu-
res the indexation of pensions to activity wages of agents. The smaller the λ, the more re-
stributive the pension system.17.
Consumers receive only a fraction ν (with 0 < ν ≤ 1) of this weighted average, and 
only during their second period of life T (a). ν denotes the average replacement rate of the 
pension system. The pension of an agent endowed with a productivity level a is:
  (13)
By means of equations (11) and (12) we obtain:
 
(14)
We also assume that the government does not use debt. It implies that for every pe-
riod we have:
 
(15)
As shown in Appendix A, we obtain the following expression:
 
(16)
It defines the tax rate in the function of the parameters of the model. We say that it 
characterizes a defined-benefit organization.
Proposition 1: In a defined-benefit PAYG pension system, τ is an increasing function 
of l18 if and only if COVT(a),a, > 0, i.e. if there are inequalities in the length of life.
This result is very intuitive. Indeed, the richer the agents, the longer their length of 
life. Therefore, an increase in λ (i.e. a decrease in the redistributivity of the pension sy-
stem) results in stronger indexation of pensions to their wages. It implies that the pensi-
ons of rich agents increase. Moreover, they benefit from these pensions for a longer pe-
riod of time than other agents. Consequently, in order to finance these additional expen-
ditures the tax rate has to be raised.
We have to note that this result depends only on the budget constraint of the gover-
nment and not on consumers’ preferences.
17 In this paper the term “redistributivity” only concerns the direct redistribution of pension systems and not the 
effective redistribution of pension systems. The effective redistribution, which is the difference between tax paid and 
amount received, can be very different because of life expectancy inequalities.
18 This proposition can partly explain why Bismarckian pension systems are bigger than Beveridgeian ones.346
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Let us now assume that we have a defined-contribution PAYG pension system (τ  is 
exogenous). It is the replacement rate ν that adjusts itself in order to maintain the gover-
nment budget constraint in equilibrium: 
 
(17)
Proposition 1 (bis): In a defined-contribution PAYG pension system, the replacement 
rate (ν) is a decreasing function of λ if and only if COVT(a),a > 0.
The intuition is the same as before. A smaller indexation to wages (a smaller λ) is be-
neficial for poor agents who live for a shorter period of time than the rich ones. Then, for 
a given replacement rate, expenditures are lower. Finally, government can increase the 
replacement rate for every agent.
Corollary 1: In a defined-benefit (defined-contribution) PAYG pension system, the 
tax rate (replacement rate) is independent of the redistributivity of the pension system if 
and only if there are no inequalities in the length of life.
Without inequalities in the length of life a variation in λ does not affect the total amo-
unt of pensions paid.
3 The Dynamics and Their Properties
The dynamics of this economy are represented through the equation of capital accu-
mulation. Furthermore, because the marginal return on capital in the production function 
is decreasing, the economy converges towards a steady state equilibrium, so that the ca-
pital level per worker is constant. The dynamics are as follows: 
 
(18)
It is straightforward to show that we finally obtain:
 
(19)
The right-hand-side of this equation is a strictly concave function of kt . Consequently, 
there is a unique non-trivial steady state which has the following form:347
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(20)
Proposition 2: In a defined-benefit PAYG pension system, a decrease in λ has a po-
sitive impact on k*.
Proof: The numerator of equation (20) is a decreasing function of λ because only τ 
depends positively on λ. Moreover, we know that T(a)/(1+βT (a) is an increasing fun-
ction of a. It implies that T(a)/(1+βT (a)) < T( )/(1 + βT( ) (>), ∀a <   (>). Then (a – 
) T(a)/(1+βT (a)) > T ( )) (a –  ), ∀a. The denominator is an increasing function of 
λ if the following condition is satisfied:  . We know that 
 ∀a ∈ Ωa. Integrating the two sides of this 
equation on the interval Ωa, the right-hand-side is equal to zero and the condition menti-
oned above is satisfied.
Two kinds of effects play a role when we analyse the effects of a decrease in λ. The 
former concerns the impact on the tax rate. Indeed, we have shown in proposition 1 that 
the tax rate is an increasing function of λ. If λ falls, the tax rate decreases for every consu-
mer, which has a positive effect on saving without ambiguity. The latter effect concerns 
the impact on the pension received by each agent. If λ decreases, consumers with a pro-
ductivity lower than   receive a higher pension, whereas consumers with a productivi-
ty higher than   receive a lower pension. The first group of agents saves less and the se-
cond one saves more. Proposition (2) shows that the net effect on saving is positive. In-
deed, the agents whose pensions decreases have a longer length of life than the others. 
Consequently, the increase in the saving of rich agents overcompensates the decrease in 
the saving of poor agents.
Proposition 2 (bis): In a defined-contribution PAYG pension system, a decrease in λ 
has a positive impact on k* if and only if:
 
(21)
Proof: τ is fixed because this is a defined-contribution pension system. It is ν that 
adjusts itself and only the last term of the denominator depends on λ. The condition en-
sures that the derivative of this term with respect to λ is positive.
With a defined-contribution PAYG pension system, we have shown in proposition 1 
(bis) that ν is a decreasing function of λ. Then, following an increase in the redistributivi-348
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ty of the pension system (a decrease in λ), the government increases the replacement rate. 
It has a positive impact on the pension of every consumer ceteris paribus, and thus a ne-
gative effect on saving. But the decrease in λ has a positive (negative) impact on the sa-
ving of agents endowed with a productivity higher (smaller) than  . The condition of the 
proposition ensures that the positive effect is higher than the two negative ones.
Proposition 3: (i) If there are no inequalities in the length of life, then k* does not de-
pend on λ. (ii) This result remains true for every homothetic preference.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
We have shown in propositions 1 and 1 (bis) that if T(a) = T for all a, then the tax 
rate (replacement rate) is independent of λ. The only effects concern the increase in the 
saving of agents endowed with a productivity higher than  , and the decrease in the sa-
ving of agents endowed with a productivity lower than  . These last two effects exactly 
compensate.
4 Wealth, Consumption and Redistribution
This section has two main objectives. The first one is to study the evolution of the 
wealth, consumption and utility of an agent, if the degree of redistribution of the pension 
system increases (λ decreases). The second one is to study the evolution of inequalities in 
consumption and welfare if λ decreases.
These analytical results are obtained at a steady state in order to simplify the exposi-
tion. Every derivative is thus a comparison between steady states.
4.1 Wealth, Welfare and Redistribution
The wealth of an agent born in a period t endowed with a productivity level a has the 
following form:
 
(22)
We want to know if the wealth of each consumer increases when the redistribution 
of the pension system is higher (λ decreases).
Proposition 4: In a defined-benefit pension system, if λ decreases then the wealth of 
agents endowed with a productivity smaller than   increases, whereas the impact on the 
wealth of other agents is ambiguous. The net effect is positive for every agent if19:
 
(23)
19 It is a sufficient condition.349
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Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 1 has shown that the tax rate is an increasing function of λ. Furthermore, 
we have shown in proposition 2 that k* is a decreasing function of λ. Then, the net wage 
for the first period of life is higher if the redistributivity of the pension system increases. 
More generally, wages per efficiency unit of work increase.
Moreover, a decrease in λ reduces the indexation of pensions to wages. Consequently, 
it has a positive impact on the pensions of agents endowed with a productivity smaller than 
 and a negative effect on the pensions of agents endowed with a productivity higher than 
. The condition in the proposition ensures that for rich agents (a >  ) all positive effects 
overcompensate the decrease in the indexation of pensions to wages.
Proposition 4 (bis): In a defined-contribution pension system, if λ decreases then:
• If the condition of proposition 2 (bis) is true, then the wealth of agents endowed 
with a productivity smaller than   increases, whereas the impact on the wealth of other 
agents is ambiguous. The net effect is positive for every agent if20:
 
(24)
• Otherwise, the net impact is ambiguous for every consumer.
Proof: See Appendix C.
If the condition of proposition 2 (bis) is true, then a decrease in λ has a positive im-
pact on k*. Furthermore, it affects the pensions of agents differently, depending on whet-
her the productivity of consumers is higher or lower than  . The effects are the same as 
before, except that τ is fixed exogenously. Every agent benefits from the increase in ν, 
particularly the agents with a long life expectancy. That is why the condition is less re-
strictive than that of proposition 4. Nevertheless, if the effect on k* is negative, then the 
impact on wealth is ambiguous for every consumer.
The utility of an agent depends on the levels of consumption in the two periods of his 
life. Using the budget constraints of consumers we obtain:
 
(25)
and
 
(26)
20 It is a sufficient condition.350
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The consumption level of his first period of life depends on λ only through the wealth 
level, whereas the consumption level of his second period of life depends on the wealth 
level and on the interest factor. The utility level is an increasing function of the redistri-
butivity of the pension system if and only if:
 
(27)
The left-hand-side represents the evolution of an agent’s wealth and the right-hand-
side shows the evolution of the interest factor. Indeed, a change in λ affects k* and thus 
the interest factor. Let us consider the case of a defined-benefit pension system. A decrea-
se in λ has a positive impact on the wealth of every consumer ((dW(a)/dλ < 0)). But at the 
same time, it reduces the interest factor (dk*/dλ < 0). The net effect on utility is thus am-
biguous. More precisely, the net effect can be negative for agents with a long life expec-
tancy because they save a large portion of their wealth and are strongly affected by the 
decrease in the interest factor.
4.2 Inequalities and Redistribution
To study inequalities, two groups of agents are used: the poorest endowed with a pro-
ductivity level a– and the richest endowed with a productivity level a+
21. The main objec-
tive is to study welfare inequalities, but relative inequalities of wealth have to be studi-
ed first.
Proposition 5: In a defined-benefit pension system, the relative inequality of wealth 
W(a–)/W(a+) is an increasing function of the redistributivity of the pension system (a de-
crease in λ) if:22
 
(28)
Proof: See Appendix D. 
The direct impact of a decrease in λ is a reduction in the pensions of rich agents
(a >  ) and an increase in those of poor agents (a <  ). It increases the ratio W(a–)/W(a+). 
Moreover, a decrease in λ has a positive effect on net wages because of its positive im-
pact on capital per capita and a negative impact on the tax rate. This effect is essentially 
beneficial for the richest. Finally, a decrease in λ has a positive impact on wt /Rt. The ri-
chest are the ones who essentially benefit from this effect because they live for a longer 
period of time. The condition of the proposition ensures that the redistributive effect do-
minates over every other.
21 For analytical convenience, we do not use here the Gini coefficient. See section 5 for the estimation of the 
Gini coefficient in our model.
22 It is a sufficient condition.351
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Proposition 5 (bis): In a defined-contribution pension system, if the condition of pro-
position 2 (bis) is true, then the relative inequality of wealth W(a–)/W(a+) is an increasing 
function of the redistributivity of the pension system (a decrease in λ) if23:
 
(29)
Proof: See Appendix D. 
The interpretation is the same as before, except that τ is fixed exogenously and that λ 
has a negative impact on ν. The increase in the replacement rate is essentially beneficial 
for agents with a long length of life, i.e. for rich agents. Condition (29) is therefore more 
restrictive than condition (28) and cannot be true for a λ which tends towards 1.
Now we can study welfare inequalities. These inequalities can be measured as the di-
fference between the utility of the richest (U (a+)) and the utility of the poorest (U (a–)). 
Analytically, it has the following form:
 
(30)
If the redistributivity of the pension system increases (λ decreases), the previous di-
fferential decreases if and only if:
 
(31)
This equation is useful because it shows in detail the different channels through which 
redistributivity has an impact on the utility differential. Let us study the case of a defi-
ned-benefit pension system. First let us assume that the condition of proposition 5 is true. 
Then, we show that the wealth ratio (W(a–)/W(a+)) is an increasing function of the redistri-
butivity of the pension system, i.e.:
 
(32)
23 It is a sufficient condition.352
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The condition (31) is more restrictive if, for the moment, we neglect the impact on 
the interest rate. Indeed, the richest can benefit from their wealth for a longer period of 
time. Then, a decrease in wealth inequalities does not necessarily imply a decrease in the 
utility differential. Nevertheless, the left-hand-side also shows that the decrease in inte-
rest rate more strongly affects the richest that save more because they live longer. This 
last effect reduces the utility differential.
5 Calibration and Results
We choose to calibrate our model on French data because the French pension system 
is purely Bismarckian. As it will be mentioned later, Hairault and Langot (2008) find that 
in the French pension system λ is 0.885. Then, we can consider the opportunity to switch 
towards a more Beveridgeian pension system.
The availability of data thanks to the study of Hairault and Langot (2008) is a key 
factor influencing our choice to consider the French case24.
First of all we have to define an interval for the set Ωa. We assume that it is:
Ω a = [0.08,1]. The ratio a+/a– is 12.5. It implies that the wage inequality ratio between the 
poorest and the richest is 12.5. Piketty (2002), studying the distribution of wages in Fran-
ce, finds a ratio of 5 between the wages of the first and of the last decile. The gap between 
this empirical fact and our calibration can be explained by the fact that we use two extre-
me values of a continuum, which results in greater wage inequalities. We could even say 
that it underestimates the reality. We choose this interval for Ω a because once it is com-
bined with the density function of a, our model matches the Gini coefficient of wage dis-
tribution calculated by Hairault and Langot (2008) on French data.
The density function of productivity levels (f (a)) has to respect the essential proper-
ty: mode<median<mean (Lambert (2001, pp.23)). This property is common for most in-
dustrialized countries. It implies that the wage distribution among population is asymme-
tric. The most common income level is less than the median wage. And, because of strong 
wage inequalities, the median wage is less than the average wage in the economy.
f (a) = b – ca, with b, c ∈ R is the simplest way to represent it. b and c have to be 
fixed, so that: f (a) > 0, ∀a and  . Furthermore, the Gini index has to tend 
towards 0.32 in order to match the estimation on French data used in Hairault and Lan-
got (2008).
Lambert (2001) shows that the Gini index can be calculated as:
 
(33)
The following density function respects these properties:
f (a) = 2,1129 – 1,9a  (34)
24 Appendix G sums up our calibration and the main statistics.353
C. Hachon: Redistribution, Pension Systems and Capital Accumulation
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 339-368 (2008)
Moreover, we can check that the mean is higher than the median because 
.
The second important function that we have to specify is T(a). For simplicity reasons 
and lack of information, we assume that this function has the form: T(a) = a. We obtain 
that   = 0.4167 and that COVT(a)a = 0.5533. It implies that the average length of life of 
the population is 77 years. It is slightly lower than the average life expectancy observed 
in France which is 80 years (World Bank)25.
The initial value of λ is fixed at 0.885. It is the estimate obtained by Hairault and Lan-
got (2008) on French data. It implies that the French pension system is highly Bismarc-
kian. The growth rate of the population is n = 0.3. It corresponds to the annual populati-
on growth rate of 0.65% calculated by Charpin (1999) on French data. The technology 
parameter is normalized to 1.
Finally, the last two parameters are presented in most economic literature using ca-
libration to solve the overlapping-generations model. The length of each period is 40 
years. The elasticity of the production function with respect to capital is α = 0.33. It also 
represents the share of capital in total output. The pure time preference factor is β = 0.6 
(d’Autume (2003)), i.e. it equals the annual psychological discount rate of 1.3%. 
We analyse the effects of a decrease in λ, i.e. an increase in the Beveridgeian part of 
the pension system26. We distinguish between the long term effects and transitional dyna-
mics for defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension systems.
5.1 The Long-Term Effects
In a defined-benefit pension system, it is the tax rate that adjusts itself and the ave-
rage replacement rate (ν) is fixed at 0.757, i.e. the value obtained by Hairault and Langot 
(2008) on French data. The annual interest rate obtained is approximately 4.4%.
Table 1: Macroeconomic impact of a more redistributive pension system (2008) on 
French data. The annual interest rate obtained is approximately 4.4%
∆λ = -11.3% Defined-Benefit Defined-Contribution
∆τ a -2.5% –
∆ν – +2.55%
∆k* +2.7% -0.15%
∆W(a+) +1.14% -0.55%
∆W(a–) +2.68% +0.053%
∆RIW b +1.53% +1.08%
∆BDPpc c +0.88% -0.05%
∆dUtil d   -1.18% -0.85%
IGb e 0.3383  0.3351
IGa 0.3364  0.3338
25 Appendix F shows that this has no impact on our qualitative results.
26 Appendix F provides a sensitivity analysis.354
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a Here we report a change in % and not in % pts.
b RIW = W(a–)/W(a+).
c GDPpc means GDP per capita
d dUTIl = U(a+) – U(a–).
e IGb (IGa) denotes the Gini coefficient before (after) the change in λ.
Note: The annual interest rate is obtained by R1/40 - 1, where R is the interest factor obtained by 
equation (9).
Source: Author
Qualitatively, the results are as expected. Indeed, an increase in the redistributivity 
of the pension system (a decrease in λ) has a negative impact on the tax rate, and a posi-
tive one on the steady state capital per worker, on the GDP per capita and on the wealth 
level. Welfare inequalities decrease.
Quantitatively, by arbitrarily reducing λ from 0.885 to 0.785, i.e. by 11.3%, we obser-
ve a decrease in the tax rate by 2.49%. The steady state level of capital per worker and 
GDP per capita increase by 2.7% and 0.88% respectively. Welfare inequalities decrea-
se by 1.18. Finally, the Gini coefficient of wealth27 decreases, which means that wealth 
inequalities decrease. Table (1) sums up the main results.
We now study the case of a defined-contribution pension system. The tax rate is 
fixed exogenously at 0.23. It is the value calculated by Hairault and Langot (2008), and 
it approximates the tax rate reported by Nyce and Schieber (2005). We also study the im-
pact of an arbitrary decrease in the annual interest rate of approximately 3.9%.
Qualitatively the results show an increase in the replacement rate. Furthermore, the 
net effect on saving is negative since the steady state capital per young decreases. This 
last effect implies a decrease in the wealth of the richest, whereas the net effect remains 
positive for the poorest because of the redistributive effect.
Quantitatively, a decrease in λ by 11.3% (from 0.885 to 0.785), results in an increa-
se in the replacement rate by 2.55%. The steady state level of capital per young and GDP 
per capita decrease by 0.15% and 0.05% respectively. The utility inequalities decrease by 
0.85%. As before, we observe a decrease in the Gini coefficient of wealth, i.e. a decrease 
in wealth inequalities. Table (1) sums up the main results.
Two conclusions can right now be stressed: (i) the net impact is greater for a defined-
benefit pension system than for a defined-contribution pension system because in the first 
case every effect has the same sign. (ii) For a defined-contribution pension system the 
only positive impact of the redistributivity is to reduce inequalities.
5.2 The Transitory Dynamics
The main objective of this part is to study the short-term effects of an unexpected de-
crease in λ by 11.3%. We assume that the economy is initially at its steady state. λ is assu-
med to remain constant during the first two periods and then to decrease to 0.785. Agents 
born in period 2 do not expect this change and thus do not adjust their saving. But, for 
every following generation the assumption of perfect foresight implies that they exactly 
27 Using the same methodology as for wage distribution, the Gini coefficient of wealth is obtained by applying 
the formula of Lambert (2001:33): 355
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capital per young
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
0.00612
0.00608
0.00604
0.00600
Figure 1   Capital per young (kt) for defined-benefit pension systems. Periods are 
reported on the abscissa.
Figure 2   Utility of the richest (Ut (a+)) for defined-benefit pension systems
utility of the richest
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
-3.225
-3.230
-3.235
-3.240
-3.245
Note: For example U1 (a+) is the utility of the richest born in period 1.
Source: Author’s calculation
adjust their saving in order to maximize their utility. Because of the unpredictability of 
the change in λ, capital per worker remains constant until period 3 and is only adjusted 
in the following periods.
In a defined-benefit pension system the tax rate becomes 0.31 from period 3 (0.3 ini-
tially). Agents born in period 1 are not affected by this change and are used as a reference. 
The capital per young is adjusted progressively to its new steady-state value. The utility 
Source: Author’s calculation356
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Figure 3   Utility of the poorest Ut (a–) for defined-benefit pension systems
utility of the poorest
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
-4.99
-4.995
-5.000
-5.005
-5.010
inequalities of utility
Figure 4   Utility differential for defined - benefit pension systems
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
1.78
1.775
1.77
1.765
Note: For example U1(a–) is the utility of the poorest born in period 1.
Source: Author’s calculation
Source: Author’s calculation
of the richest decreases substantially for agents born in period 2 because they do not suf-
ficiently save for their second period of life. But the utility of the poorest increases until 
it reaches a new steady state value which is higher. 357
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Figure 5   Capital per young (kt) for defined-contribution pension systems
capital per young
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
8.022E-3
8.02E-3
8.018E-3
8.016E-3
8.014E-3
8.012E-3
Source: Author’s calculation
Figure 6   Utility of the richest (Ut (a+) for defined-contribution pension systems
Source: Author’s calculation
utility of the richest
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
-3.064
-3.066
-3.068
-3.07
Utility inequalities decrease strongly, as early as the second generation, and then sta-
bilize after a very small increase because of adjustment in the saving of the richest. Figu-
res 1-4 sum up the main results.
For defined-contribution pension systems the simulation is the same. Qualitative re-
sults show a quick adjustment of variables towards their new steady state value. Only the 358
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Figure 8   Utility of the poorest (Ut (a–) for defined-contribution pension systems
utility of the poorest
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
-4.803
-4.804
-4.805
-4.806
-4.807
-4.808
Figure 9   Utility differential for defined-contribution pension systems
inequality of utility
1 2 3  4 5 6  7
1.746
1.744
1.742
1.74
1.738
1.736
1.734
1.732
Source: Author’s calculation
Source: Author’s calculation
utility levels of consumers born in period 2 describe a different trajectory. The utility of 
the richest and that of the poorest decrease and increase respectively. Figures 5-8 sum up 
the main results.
Remark: Qualitative and quantitative results are very different depending on the na-
ture of the pension system (defined-benefit or defined-contribution). This has to be taken 
into account in studying the impact of a change in the redistributive properties of a pen-
sion system.359
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6 Conclusion
An increase in the redistributivity of a defined-benefit pension system can: (i) decre-
ase the tax rate of the pension system; (ii) increase the capital per capita; (iii) increase the 
wealth and welfare of every agent; (iv) reduce inequalities in wealth and welfare. Howe-
ver, if the pension system has a defined-contribution structure, then the only positive ef-
fect is that it increases the wealth and utility of poorest agents.
Therefore, both the knowledge of the nature of a pension system (defined-benefit or 
defined-contribution) and taking into account of life expectancy inequalities are impor-
tant for the assessment of qualitative and quantitative impacts of a more redistributive 
pension system.
The first extension of this paper would be to introduce labour supply in order to take 
into account the distortive impact of our redistributive policy.
Another application of this paper would be to study the impact of redistributive po-
licies on educational choices. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, and given the 
above described mechanism, a possible implication of a more redistributive pension sy-
stem is that a larger share of the population decides to educate itself.360
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Appendix A
A computation of the expression of τ:
.
 
(35)
Furthermore, we know that:
.
 
(36)
By computing the right-hand-side, we obtain the following expression:
 
(37)
Equation (3) implies:  . The second part of the expre-
ssion between brackets is the average length of life. Finally we have:
.
 
(38)
On the left-hand-side we recognize the average wage:  . Then, by 
equalizing the left-hand-side to the right-hand-side we obtain equation (16).
Appendix B
a) The study of equation (20) shows that τ and the denominator become independent 
of λ if, T(a) = a, ∀a.
b) Let us consider the case of homothetic preferences which have the following 
form:
.
 
(39)
The intertemporal budget constraint of this agent is:361
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(40)
Given the preferences, the solution for consumers is:
  (41)
And finally:
 
(42)
Therefore, saving is a linear function of wage and of pension. Assuming that the len-
gth of life is the same for every agent (T(a) = ∀a), then the capital market equilibrium 
can be written as:
 
(43)
or:
 
(44)
λ does not appear in this expression.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 4:
The derivative of equation (22) with respect to λ gives the following expression:
We know that dτ/ dλ > 0 and that dk*/ dλ < 0. Finally, the previous expression is ne-
gative if the second part of the equation is negative, i.e. if:362
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However, as the right-hand-side is a decreasing function of a, it is sufficient for this 
inequality to be true for a = a+.
Remark: This inequality is always true for a < 
Proof of Proposition 4 (bis):
The methodology is the same as before, except that τ is fixed exogenously and that 
ν is a decreasing function of λ.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 5:
Equation (22) can be written as:
 
(45)
or, in the steady state:
 
(46)
With equation (20), the left-hand-side between brackets can be written as:
Equation (46) becomes:
 
(47)
The relative wealth inequalities can be written as:363
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(48)
The result of the proposition is obtained if the derivative of this expression with res-
pect to λ is negative. It is true if and only if:
The left-hand-side has two components. The second is obviously negative. It is strai-
ght-forward to show that   and then that the left hand side is negative.
It only remains to show that the right-hand-side is positive. It is true under the con-
dition of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 5 (bis):
The relative wealth inequalities can be written as:
 
(49)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λ is negative, if and only if:
where 364
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The last two terms are strictly negative. Then, under the condition dk/ dλ < 0, and 
knowing that dν/dλ < 0, the sign of the first term depends only on the sign of the condi-
tion mentioned in the proposition.
Appendix E
The covariance can also be written as:  . But as 
, we can write that: 
 
with X a constant, whatever the value of X. So it is particularly true for X = T ( ). Then, we 
can write that: 
 
. The RHS 
is positive as it is an integral on a product of terms with the same sign because T’(a) >0.
Appendix F
In this Appendix we try to determine if our qualitative results depend on an initial 
condition, on the form taken by T (a) or on values taken by our parameters, notably the 
average replacement rate (ν) or tax rate (τ). In doing so, we extend our results to other co-
untries besides France.
For defined-benefit pension systems
Firstly, let us consider the impact of a decrease in λ in function of its initial value. A 
simple numeric exercise, using our calibration, shows that our qualitative results remain 
true whatever the initial value of λ and whatever the percentage of change in λ. It impli-
es that a decrease in λ has always a positive impact on capital per capita and on the weal-
th of every agent. It also always has a negative impact on wealth inequalities, on the Gini 
coefficient and on the utility differential (dUtil).
Secondly, we do the same exercise but with the new function T(a) = a0,75. The form 
of this function implies that the average life expectancy of agents in our model is 80 
years, which matches the observed life expectancy in most industrialized countries. We 
find the same qualitative results. As previously, our results do not depend on the initial 
value taken by λ.
Thirdly, we solve our model for different values of ν (ν ∈ {0.757,0.6,0.4})28. Whate-
ver the function T(a) which is chosen, our qualitative results are unchanged.
28 ν = 0.4 seems to be the lowest replacement rate among industrialized countries. See Nyce and Schieber 
(2005:236).365
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For defined-contribution pension systems:
We find a monotonous relationship between macroeconomic variables and λ. It im-
plies that the impact of λ on macroeconomic variables has the same sign as this reported 
in Table 1, whatever its initial value.
As in the defined-benefit case, the use of the functional form T(a) = a0.75 has no impact 
on our qualitative results. λ still has a monotonous impact on macroeconomic variables.
Finally, we check whether our qualitative results remain unchanged for τ ∈ 
{0.1;0,23;0,3}.
Appendix G
In this Appendix, we sum up our calibrations of the functions and of the parameters 
of our model. Furthermore, we show some important statistics. 
The Basic Calibration
The length of each period is 40 years. Table 2 sums up the basic parameters used for 
the numerical resolution of our model.
Table 2 Basic Calibration of the Model
Parameter Meaning Value Source(s)
α Rt Kt / Yt 
a 0.33 Sommacal (2006) among others
β Actualization factor 0.6
APDR = 1.3%b, d’Autume (2003)
Heer and Maussner (2005)
The technology level 1 Normalization
A Population’s growth rate 0.3 AGR = 0.65%c, Charpin (1999)
n Average replacement rated 0.757 Hairault and Langot (2008)
ν Tax ratee 0.23 Hairault and Langot (2008)
τ Initial value of λf 0.885 Hairault and Langot (2008)
a The share of income spent on capital.
b Annual psychological discount rate.
c AGR = annual growth rate.
d For defined-benefit pension systems.
e For defined-contribution pension systems.
f  We use this value as a reference. We analyse the effects of a decrease in λ knowing that λ is ini-
tially λI.
Source: Author
The Calibration of Functions and Their Main Statistics
Firstly, we calibrate the interval Ωa. We use:
Ωa = [0.08,1]366
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The ratio a+/a– is lower than the one found in Acemoglu (2002), but higher than the 
one in Piketty (2002). The corresponding density function is:
f (a) = 2.1129 – 1.9a (50)
These two components respect the two main properties:
• Mode < median < mean; Source: Lambert (2001), and 
• IGw = 0.3229 in France; Source: Hairault and Langot (2008), INSEE (1999)
In our model, we have:
 = 0.4167
amedium = 0.378
amode = a– = 0.08
Var(a) = 0.005533
Secondly, we calibrate the function T(a):
T(a) = a
It implies that the distribution of the length of life has the same properties as the dis-
tribution of the variable. Furthermore, we have:
COVT(a),a = Var(a) = 0.05533
Knowing that the length of each period is 40 years, the average length of life30 is 77 
years. It is lower than the figure for France which is around 80 years31 (Source: INSEE or 
World Bank). The standard deviation is:
σT(a) = 0.24
which corresponds to a standard deviation of almost 9.4 years32.
29 IGw denotes the Gini coefficient of wages.
30 The life expectancy of each individual is (1+T(a)) * 40
31 Appendix F shows that this has no impact on our qualitative results.
32 The standard deviation for the function T(a) = a0.75 is below 9 years.367
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